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CASE NOTES
Trusts-ADMISSIBILITY OF ExTRiNsIc EVIDENCE, THE EFFECT OF POSSIBLE
ILLEGALITY ON A REVERSIONARY INTEREST, AND THE DuTIEs OF A FiDuciARY
TO SUCCESSIVE BENEFICIARIES-In re Trust Known as Great Northern Iron
Ore Properties, 263 N.W.2d 610 (Minn.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 835
(1978).
In recent years, the Minnesota Supreme Court has spoken infre-
quently on the law of trusts. Its two decisions concerning the Great
Northern Iron Ore Properties trust, therefore, take on significance be-
yond the actual decisions.' In these cases, the court addressed issues
involving the admissibility of extrinsic evidence to interpret trust provi-
sions,2 the effect of possible illegality of reversionary interests, ' and the
duties owed by a fiduciary to successive beneficiaries.'
The Great Northern trust encompasses thousands of acres of Minne-
sota land being mined for iron ore under long-term royalty leases.5 The
settlor of the trust, Lake Superior Company, Ltd., organized by James
J. Hill and his associates, established the trust on December 7, 1906.'
The trust was to endure for the lives of eighteen named individuals plus
twenty years, "unless . . .sooner determined."' Upon termination of
the trust, all remaining cash assets are to be conveyed to the beneficiar-
ies of the trust income,' holders of certificates traded on the New York
Stock Exchange.' Non-cash property is to revert to the settlor or its
assigns, 0 presently Burlington Northern Inc." (reversioner).
1. See In re Trust Known as Great Northern Iron Ore Properties, 263 N.W.2d 610
(Minn.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 835 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Great Northern I]; In re
Trust Known as Great Northern Iron Ore Properties, 308 Minn. 221, 243 N.W.2d 302, cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1001 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Great Northern 11.
2. See notes 29-32, 40-48 infra and accompanying text.
3. See notes 33, 64-83 infra and accompanying text.
4. See notes 84-86 infra and accompanying text.
5. See Great Northern II, 263 N.W.2d at 614.
6. See Great Northern I, 308 Minn. at 223-24, 243 N.W.2d at 304. In the years between
1896 and 1898, James J. Hill personally acquired vast acreages of iron ore property. See
Supplemental Record at SR-6 to -7, -50 to -52, -118 to -19, Great Northern I, 308 Minn.
221, 243 N.W.2d 302, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1001 (1976) (excerpts from testimony by James
J. Hill before the United States House of Representatives in 1907 and 1913). Hill subse-
quently assigned his title to the land in blank to a number of land companies owned by
the Great Northern Railway. See id. at SR-119. On October 20, 1899, the Great Northern
Railway conveyed its stock in the various land companies to Lake Superior Company,
Ltd., see id. at SR-110 to -115, a Michigan limited partnership created on August 29, 1899.
See Addendum to Brief on Behalf of Charles S. Arms and Elizabeth P. Arms, Respondents
at 39, Great Northern I, 308 Minn. 221, 243 N.W.2d 302, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1001 (1976).
7. See Great Northern I, 308 Minn. at 226 & n.4, 243 N.W.2d at 306 & n.4.
8. See Great Northern II, 263 N.W.2d at 614 & n.4 (quoting paragraph 17 of the trust
instrument).
9. Id. at 614.
10. See id. at 614 n.4 (quoting paragraph 17 of the trust instrument). A copy of the
complete trust instrument may be found in Appellants' Appendix at A-4 to -14, Great
Northern I, 308 Minn. 221, 243 N.W.2d 302, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1001 (1976).
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In 1972, the trustees, in view of the nearing conclusion of the trust,
petitioned the Ramsey County District Court for instructions on their
duties and responsibilities toward the conflicting interests of the certifi-
cate holders and the reversioner.'2 Several certificate holders'3 (respon-
dents) intervened in the action, contending that the settlor had estab-
lished the trust entirely for their benefit and that the terms of the trust
obligated the trustees to convert the trust assets into cash for distribu-
tion prior to termination of the trust." After the trustees amended their
petition to include a request for instructions on their duty to convert
trust property to cash,'5 the reversioner filed an objection, arguing that
the trust plainly provided that the certificate holders were entitled to
the income generated by the corpus and the proceeds from sale of the
corpus, but only during the trust term.'" The reversioner asserted that
upon termination, the residual property was to be for the exclusive
benefit of the reversioner."
11. On February 3, 1913, Lake Superior Company, Ltd. transferred its reversionary
interest in the trust to the Great Northern Railway Company. See Brief of Appellant
Burlington Northern Inc. at 43-44, Great Northern I, 308 Minn. 221, 243 N.W.2d 302, cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1001 (1976). Burlington Northern acquired its interest through a merger
between the Great Northern Railway Company, the Great Northern Pacific & Burlington
Lines, Inc., the Northern Pacific Railway Company, and the Pacific Coast Railroad Com-
pany. See Supplemental Record at SR-378, Great Northern I, 308 Minn. 221, 243 N.W.2d
302, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1001 (1976).
12. See Great Northern II, 263 N.W.2d at 613-14. See generally Act of Apr. 15, 1933,
ch. 259, § 3, 1933 Minn. Laws 329, 329-30 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 501.35 (1978))
(1972 version provides that a trustee may petition the district court for instructions in the
administration of the trust or for construction of the trust instrument).
At the time of the original petition for instructions in 1972, only five of the 18 named
measuring lives were still living. See Great Northern II, 263 N.W.2d at 614 n.1. At the
time of the respondents' petition for certiorari following Great Northern II, only two
remained, aged 76 and 92. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Arms v. Watson, 439
U.S. 835, denying cert. to Great Northern II, 263 N.W.2d 610 (Minn. 1978). For a complete
list of the 18 measuring lives and their dates of birth, see Supplemental Record at SR-
519, Great Northern I, 308 Minn. 221, 243 N.W.2d 302, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1001 (1976).
13. Certificate holders Charles S. Arms and Elizabeth P. Arms petitioned the district
court for permission to intervene in the matter. See Appellants' Appendix at A-15 to -17,
Great Northern I, 308 Minn. 221, 243 N.W.2d 302, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1001 (1976)
(petition of Charles S. Arms and Elizabeth P. Arms). The Arms originally requested that
the hearings proceed as a class action on behalf of all certificate holders, see id., however,
the district court, in its order of December 20, 1972, ruled that such an action could not
be maintained. See id. at A-35, -37 (order and memorandum of the district court). In
Great Northern II, the only certificate holders involved were the Arms and Margot Siegel
[hereinafter referred to as respondents]. See 263 N.W.2d at 613.
14. See Appellants' Appendix at A-16, Great Northern I, 308 Minn. 221, 243 N.W.2d
302, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1001 (1976) (petition of Charles A. Arms and Elizabeth P.
Arms).
15. See id. at A-19 to -21.
16. See id. at A-22 to -25.
17. See id.
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The district court, finding certain sections of the trust instrument
ambiguous, admitted extrinsic evidence to construe the trust terms, and
determined that the settlor had believed the trust would end by the time
the natural ore was depleted. 8 The district court held that, as a result,
the reversion was intended to be a receptacle for valueless properties
because the settlor had not anticipated the significant value of tacon-
ite." Furthermore, the language "unless. . . sooner determined" in the
termination clause was construed as an authorization for the trustees to
end the trust before its stated expiration. 20 Extrinsic evidence also was
relied on to explain the apparent inconsistency between the clause em-
powering the trustees to sell the corpus and the provision requiring
transfer of all non-cash property to the reversioner upon termination."'
Because the trustees could liquidate trust assets, the district court found
the reversionary interest to be illusory.2 Based on these findings, the
district court advised the trustees that the settlor's sole purpose in creat-
ing the trust was to benefit the certificate holders.2 The district court
also concluded that the settlor had not intended to vest ownership of the
property in the railroad, because to do so would have constituted a
violation of the railroad's corporate charter as well as federal law.2
Therefore, the district court ruled that the trust should be terminated 5
and it ordered the trustees to draft a proposal, to be approved by the
district court, that would convey all trust assets into a corporation.26 The
certificate holders would own shares in the corporation equivalent to
their shares in the trust and the reversionary interest would be de-
feated.?
Upon appeal by the reversioner, the Minnesota Supreme Court re-
versed the district court's holding in In re Trust Known as Great North-
ern Iron Ore Properties8 (Great Northern 1). The court held that the
phrase "unless. . . sooner determined" was an unambiguous and com-
monly used trust term that merely anticipated legislative action or other
legal situations that could defeat the trust before its stated termina-
tion." The court also found that the provisions defining the trustee's
18. See Great Northern I, 308 Minn. at 224, 243 N.W.2d at 305; Appellants' Appendix
at A-46 to -49. The entire memorandum and instructions issued to the trustees by the
Ramsey County District Court may be found in Appellants' Appendix at A-45 to -98.
19. See 308 Minn. at 227-28, 243 N.W.2d at 306; Appellants' Appendix at A-91 to -96.
20. See 308 Minn. at 227 & n.4, 243 N.W.2d at 306 & n.4.
21. Id. at 228-29, 243 N.W.2d at 306-07; Appellants' Appendix at A-48 to -49.
22. See Appellants' Appendix at A-93 to -98.
23. See id.
24. See 308 Minn. at 229-30, 243 N.W.2d at 307; Appellants' Appendix at A-89 to -90.
25. 308 Minn. at 224, 243 N.W.2d at 305; Appellants' Appendix at A-96 to -98.
26. 308 Minn. at 224, 243 N.W.2d at 305; Appellants' Appendix at A-96 to -98.
27. See 308 Minn. at 224, 243 N.W.2d at 305; Appellants' Appendix at A-96 to -98.
28. 308 Minn. 221, 243 N.W.2d 302, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1001 (1976).
29. Id. at 227, 243 N.W.2d at 306. The court mentioned three common situations in
which termination could occur: failure of the subject matter through exhaustion of the ore,
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power to sell were not inconsistent 3' because the trust clearly stated that
properties not liquidated by the trustees in their discretion prior to
termination must be turned over to the reversioner upon the conclusion
of the trust.3' Thus, extrinsic evidence was inadmissible to "vary the
plain meaning expressed in the [trust] instrument."32 The court also
concluded that neither the settlor's intent nor the validity of the rever-
sionary interest could be affected by the possibility that subsequent
possession of the reversion by the railroad may violate both its charter
and federal law.33 Because the lower court had ordered the trust termi-
nated, the supreme court remanded the case for further proceedings.3
The district court was directed to issue instructions to the trustees con-
sistent with the supreme court's opinion.3
On remand, the district court again utilized extrinsic evidence to
construe the settlor's purpose in creating the trust." The district court
found that the settlor's intent, the "unambiguous meaning" of the trust,
and a "practical construction" of the trust required the trustees to con-
vert the trust assets to cash for the sole benefit of the certificate holders
prior to the end of the trust term .37 In conclusion, the district court held
that the trustees owed no duty to the reversioner.
3
1
Once again the reversioner appealed, and for the second time the
supreme court reversed in In re Trust Known as Great Northern Iron Ore
Properties39 (Great Northern 11). In the second appeal, the supreme
court first considered the district court's instructions to the trustees.
The respondents argued that the instructions were supported by the
termination clause of the trust instrument. The clause directs the
trustees to "wind up" trust affairs at the conclusion of the trust and
declares the trust terminated one year prior to the end of the statutory
perpetuities period."0 The respondents asserted that the termination
termination by mutual consent, and termination resulting from amendment of Minnesota
statutes relating to trusts. Id. See also Brief of Appellant Burlington Northern Inc. at 74-
75.
30. 308 Minn. at 228-29, 243 N.W.2d at 306-07; see Brief of Appellant Burlington
Northern Inc. at 75-82.
31. 308 Minn. at 228, 243 N.W.2d at 307.
32. Id. at 227, 243 N.W.2d at 306.
33. Id. at 229-30, 243 N.W.2d at 307.
34. Id. at 231-32, 243 N.W.2d at 308.
35. See id.
36. See Great Northern II, 263 N.W.2d at 615; Appellants' Appendix Burlington North-
ern Inc. at A-22 to -30 (memorandum of instructions to the trustees by the district court
dated February 17, 1977).
37. See note 36 supra.
38. See id.
39. 263 N.W.2d 610 (Minn.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 835 (1978).
40. Appellants' Appendix at A-13, Great Northern I, 308 Minn. 221, 243 N.W.2d 302,
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1001 (1976) (quoting paragraph 17 of the trust instrument; trustees
to "wind up" trust affairs upon the death of the last of 18 named lives plus 20 years). See
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clause should be construed to require liquidation of all trust assets and
distribution of the proceeds solely to the certificate holders during the
final year of the trust.4 The court held, however, that the respondents'
argument was without merit because the trust instrument contained a
definition of the term "wind up. ' 42 Therefore, the term could not be
given a meaning other than that contained in the trust instrument.
4 3
Second, the respondents argued that the settlor did not intend the
reversioner to receive anything of value at the end of the trust term.
44
They asserted that letters and statements made by James J. Hill at the
inception of the trus~testablished that the settlor expected the trust's
marketable ore supply to be exhausted before the end of the trust term.
45
The supreme court, repeating its earlier determination that the trust
instrument was unambiguous on its face, 4 rejected this assertion, hold-
ing that the settlor's intent was clear from the four comers of the trust
instrument.4 7 The court found that the trust clearly created a reversion-
ary interest in all real property remaining at the termination of the
trust.
41
Third, the respondents argued that a "practical construction" of the
trust instrument, in light of past sales of the trust corpus by the trustees,
would give rise to a duty to sell all properties and distribute the proceeds
to the certificate holders as the trust neared termination. 9 The court
decided that merely because some proceeds from land sales had been
distributed to the certificate holders in the past did not mean the rever-
sioner would be estopped from contesting liquidation of the corpus in
generally MINN. Rxv. LAws ch. 60, § 3249(6) (1905) (current version at MINN. STAT. §
501.11(6) (1978)) (a trust shall not continue for a period longer than the life or lives of
specified persons in being at the time of its creation plus 21 years).
41. 263 N.W.2d at 616; Brief of Respondents Charles S. Arms and Elizabeth P. Arms
at 26-31.
42. 263 N.W.2d at 617 (quoting paragraph 17 of the trust instrument).
43. Id. The court stated that "[hlad the settlor intended to require conversion of all
trust assets to cash, it could have so provided." Id.
44. Id.; Brief of Respondents Charles S. Arms and Elizabeth P. Arms at 9-19.
45. 263 N.W.2d at 617. For a complete record of the extrinsic evidence offered by the
respondents, see Supplemental Record, Great Northern I, 308 Minn. 221, 243 N.W.2d 302,
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1001 (1976).
46. 263 N.W.2d at 617-18 ("trial court's reliance upon ... extrinsic evidence .. .is
clearly inconsistent with this court's prior opinion [in Great Northern I]").
47. See id. Because trusts are subject to the rules governing parol evidence, the court's
finding that the trust was unambiguous precluded the admission of extrinsic evidence
offered by the respondents. See, e.g., In re Declaration of Trust Made by Bush, 249 Minn.
36, 42-43, 81 N.W.2d 615, 620 (1957) (applying parol evidence rule in determination
whether extrinsic evidence should be admitted); Jordan v. Jordan, 193 Minn. 428, 431-
32, 259 N.W. 386, 388 (1935) (trust agreements are subject to law governing other writ-
ings).
48. 263 N.W.2d at 617-18.
49. See id. at 618; Brief of Respondents Charles S. Arms and Elizabeth P. Arms at 31-
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the future. In addition, the court found that the liquidation of trust
assets was clearly within the trustees' discretionary powers but was not
a mandatory duty.51 The instruction to convert trust assets was held to
be erroneous as well as inconsistent with the court's opinion in Great
Northern I. 1
Having determined that no duty to convert trust assets to cash could
be found in the trust instrument, the court next considered whether a
fiduciary duty to liquidate the corpus could be imposed upon the trus-
tees by operation of law. The respondents maintained that the trust was
a "business trust" and, therefore, the duties owed by the trustees to the
reversioner were not governed by the ordinary principles of the law of
trusts.5 The court distinguished the Great Northern trust from an ordi-
nary business trust by observing that the trust, unlike a business trust,
was not created by a contract combining capital contributions, but
rather by a gift from the settlor.5 4 Furthermore, the certificate holders
had not contributed to any of the trust principal.5 5 All of the trust
50. 263 N.W.2d at 618.
51. Id. The trust instrument expressly grants a discretionary power to the trustees to
sell or exchange any or all of the trust property. See Appellants, Appendix at A-10,
Great Northern I, 308 Minn. 221, 243 N.W.2d 302, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1001 (1976)
(paragraph 9 of the trust instrument). Similarly, the trustees may distribute and pay to
the beneficiaries that portion of the net income or proceeds from the sale of the property
as the trustees deem proper. See id. at A-8 (paragraph 4 of the trust instrument).
Prior decisions by the supreme court support the holding in Great Northern II. Under
Minnesota law, a trustee is bound only to common law fiduciary principles when exercis-
ing discretionary powers under a trust. See, e.g., In re Trust Under Will of Comstock, 219
Minn. 325, 332-35, 17 N.W.2d 656, 661-62 (1945) (discretionary power of sale; trustee must
employ diligence and prudence when exercising discretion); In re Trusts Under Will of
McCann, 212 Minn. 233, 240-41, 3 N.W.2d 226, 230-31 (1942) (discretionary power of sale;
trustee must use sound judgment in exercising broad discretionary powers); In re Trust
Created by Watland, 211 Minn. 84, 92, 300 N.W. 195, 199 (1941) (discretionary payment
of trust income to beneficiaries; trustees "bound to exercise a soundness of judgment
which follows from a due appreciation of trust responsibility"). It is apparent, therefore,
that while past conduct by a trustee does not create an estoppel, see 263 N.W.2d at 618,
a dissatisfied beneficiary may recover damages suffered if the deviation from prior conduct
by the trustee constitutes a fiduciary violation. Cf. In re Trust Created by Watland, 211
Minn. 84, 93, 300 N.W. 195, 200 (1941) (trustees found liable for misapplication of stock
proceeds as income).
52. See 263 N.W.2d at 618.
53. Id. at 619; Brief of Respondents Charles S. Arms and Elizabeth P. Arms at 64-68.
54. 263 N.W.2d at 619.
55. See id. A business trust is commonly organized as a device for profit-making
whereby investors, the ultimate beneficiaries of the trust, contribute capital. See, e.g.,
Berry v. McCourt, 1 Ohio App. 2d 172, 177-78, 204 N.E.2d 235, 240 (1965) (business trust
not created when entity arose from a gift rather than capital contributed by the beneficiar-
ies); G. BOGaRT, THE LAw OF TRUSTS AND TRus-ru § 247, at 147-50 (rev. 2d ed. 1977). The
business trust entity originally developed in Massachusetts because the general incorpora-
tion statutes did not permit corporations to be organized for the purpose of developing
and dealing in real estate. See Comment, 37 YALZ L.J. 1103, 1106 (1928). See generally
MINN, STAT. §§ 318.01-.06 (1978) (business trusts presently governed by statute).
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property had been originally purchased by James J. Hill with his own
funds, conveyed to Lake Superior Company, Ltd., and ultimately trans-
ferred to the trust." While the court determined that the trust bore
"more of the characteristics of an ordinary trust," 7 the court found it
unnecessary to make a final decision regarding the nature of the trust,
ruling that the trustees of any form of trust are subject to "the underly-
ing equitable and fiduciary duties toward trust beneficiaries imposed by
the common law of trusts.
'5 8
The respondents next argued that, because the corpus is a wasting
asset, the trustees would violate no fiduciary duty by mining the prop-
*erty to exhaustion during the trust term.59 Consequently, the respon-
dents contended, the trustees were bound to exhaust the corpus before
expiration of the trust term, or, if this could not be accomplished, to sell
all trust property and distribute the proceeds to the certificate holders. 0
The supreme court disagreed, distinguishing between the orderly, con-
sistent mining of an asset to gradual consumption and the deliberate
attempt to liquidate the entire asset for the sole benefit of the income
beneficiaries and to the exclusion of the reversionary beneficiaries. 6'
While the life beneficiaries may be entitled to the entire trust income
even if the corpus is exhausted, the court held that a reversionary inter-
est may not be destroyed if time does not allow depletion of the wasting
asset during the trust term." The court concluded: "Such complete and
deliberate liquidation of the entire reversion for the benefit of income
beneficiaries cannot be allowed with impunity."63
The respondents also repeated an argument from Great Northern I,
asserting that the trustees owed no duty to the reversioner because the
56. See note 6 supra.
57. 263 N.W.2d at 619.
58. Id. at 620. Usually, trustees of a business trust have been held subject to the
fiduciary duties imposed upon all trustees under traditional trust principles. See, e.g.,
Goldwater v. Oltman, 210 Cal. 408, 420-22, 292 P. 624, 629 (1930) (new use of trust form
does not mean new principles should apply); Schumann-Heink v. Folsom, 328111. 321, 326-
27, 159 N.E. 250, 252 (1927) (well-established principles of contracts and trusts applied
to business trust); Hauser v. Catlett, 197 Okla. 668, 674-75, 173 P.2d 728, 735 (1946)
(business trusts, being trusts, subject to traditional trust principles); cf. Win. Lindeke
Land Co. v. Kalman, 190 Minn. 601, 610, 252 N.W. 650, 654 (1934) (contracts regarding
business trusts subject to rules governing construction of ordinary contracts). But see
Berry v. McCourt, 1 Ohio App. 2d 172, 177, 204 N.E.2d 235, 240 (1965) (states with a
liberal interpretation of business trusts have deviated from application of traditional trust
principles).
59. 263 N.W.2d at 620; Brief of Respondents Charles S. Arms and Elizabeth P. Arms
at 19-26.
60. See note 59 supra.
61. See 263 N.W.2d at 620.
62. See id.
63. Id.
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reversioner could not legally possess its reversionary interest.6' Their
position was based on the rule, followed in Minnesota, that when one
or more of the purposes for establishing a trust becomes illegal, the trust
will be terminated. 5 The respondents argued that a provision of the
Great Northern charter, to which the reversioner had succeeded,6 pro-
hibited the railway from owning or acquiring mineral lands. 7 In addi-
tion, several Minnesota land statutes, in force when the trust was exe-
cuted, forbade railroads from acquiring lands unnecessary to railroad
operation.8 More importantly, the respondents contended, federal law
64. See id. at 620-21; Brief of Respondents Charles S. Arms and Elizabeth P. Arms at
72-85.
65. See, e.g., Rong v. Hailer, 109 Minn. 191, 198, 123 N.W. 471, 472 (1909) (violation
of rule against perpetuities voided trust); Appelgate v. Brown, 168 Neb. 190, 200, 95
N.W.2d 341, 348 (1959) (any provision of a trust is valid unless it appears to be created
for an illegal purpose); G. BOGERT, THE LAw OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEEs § 211, at 402 (rev.
2d ed. 1979) (trusts that aid in evasion of civil or criminal statutes may be held void);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusTs §§ 61, 65, & 335, Comment d at 156 (1959) (when trust
purpose initially or subsequently becomes illegal, trust will be terminated); cf. Evans v.
Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 439 (1970) (charitable trust) (trust created for maintenance of segre-
gated park terminated due to illegality of segregation); Pennsylvania v. Brown, 260 F.
Supp. 323, 357 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (charitable trust) (because dispositions by trust must
originally comply with applicable law as well as with later laws, trust establishing charita-
ble school for poor white orphans cannot be enforced), vacated on other grounds, 373 F.2d
771 (3d Cir. 1967).
If, however, the illegal provision of the trust is separable from other valid clauses, only
the illegal portion will fail. See, e.g., Burns v. Grable, 138 Cal. App. 2d 280, 287-89, 291
P.2d 969, 974 (valid portions of trust disturbed only when removing illegal provision will
upset entire trust purpose), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 842 (1956); In re Gump's Estate, 16 Cal.
2d 535, 547-48, 107 P.2d 17, 23-24 (1940) (provision in violation of rule against perpetuities
severed from otherwise valid portions of trust); Wilmington Trust Co. v. Wilmington
Trust Co., 25 Del. Ch. 121, 150-53, 15 A.2d 153, 167 (1940) (valid trust provisions indepen-
dent and separable from provision that violated rule against perpetuities), aff'd, 26 Del.
Ch. 397, 24 A.2d 309 (1942); Bemis v. Northwestern Trust Co., 117 Minn. 409, 414, 135
N.W. 1124, 1125 (1912) (when there are distinct and individual provisions in a trust, some
valid and some invalid, effect is given those that are valid); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRusTs § 65 (1959) (if an illegal trust provision can be separated from other provisions
without defeating the trust's purpose, valid portions will stand).
66. See note 11 supra.
67. 263 N.W.2d at 620-21; Brief of Respondents Charles S. Arms and Elizabeth P. Arms
at 77-84.
68. 263 N.W.2d at 620-21; Brief of Respondents Charles S. Arms and Elizabeth P. Arms
at 80-83; see MINN. REv. LAws ch. 59, §§ 3237, 3239 (1905) (repealed 1945) (prohibiting
railroads from holding or acquiring lands other than as may be necessary for their opera-
tion, upon penalty of forfeiture of such lands).
Because the trust corpus consisted of stock holdings in several corporations until 1956,
see Brief of Respondents Charles S. Arms and Elizabeth P. Arms at 81-82, Great Northern
I, 308 Minn. 221, 243 N.W.2d 302, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1001 (1976), and should therefore
have been considered personalty under Minnesota law, see Congdon v. Congdon, 160
Minn. 343, 371-76, 200 N.W. 76, 86-88 (1924), the claim of the respondents is arguably
erroneous. The land statutes will not prevent Burlington Northern from taking title to the
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prevented the reversioner from legally holding the reversion." Their
argument was based on the commodities clause of the Hepburn Act,70
which prohibits a company from transporting ore from any land in
which it has any direct or indirect interest.7
The Great Northern II court rejected the illegality argument because
Great Northern Railway had not acquired its interest in the trust until
seven years after the trust had been created. 2 Thus, the court, extending
its conclusion from Great Northern I to the three illegality claims, held
that the reversion could not be defeated when it was valid at the incep-
tion of the trust solely because the reversioner may be prohibited from
retaining the reversion upon termination of the trusty.3 Moreover, the
court stated, the proper-time to contest the reversion would be at the
end of the trust term. The opinion of the Great Northern II court
apparently recognized a distinction between the trust doctrine of illegal
purpose and situations where the law would prevent the reversioner
from holding title in the corpus. Typical instances in which the illegal
purpose doctrine has been invoked include trusts to induce a criminal
corpus upon termination of the trust due to their repeal in 1945. See Act of Apr. 13, 1945,
ch. 280, § 1(3), 1945 Minn. Laws 468, 469 (repealing MINN. REv. LAws ch. 59, §§ 3237,
3239 (1905)).
69. 263 N.W.2d at 620-21; Brief of Respondents Charles S. Arms and Elizabeth P. Arms
at 74-77. The respondents supported their argument by quoting dicta from the 1950
decision of Reynolds v. Hill, 184 F.2d 294, 297-98 (8th Cir. 1950), aff'g 75 F. Supp. 408
(D. Minn. 1948), where the court stated that the Great Northern trust was established to
avoid violating the Hepburn Act.
70. Hepburn Act, § 1, para. 5, 34 Stat. 584, 585 (1906) (current version at 49 U.S.C. §
1(8) (1976)).
71. The commodities clause of the Hepburn Act states as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any railroad company to transport from any State,
Territory, or the District of Columbia, to any other State, Territory, or the
District of Columbia, or to any foreign country, any article or commodity, other
than timber and the manufactured products thereof, manufactured, mined, or
produced by it, or under its authority, or which it may own in whole or in part,
or in which it may have any interest, direct or indirect, except such articles or
commodities as may be necessary and intended for its use in the conduct of its
business as a common carrier.
Hepburn Act § 1, para. 5, 49 U.S.C. § 1(8) (1976).
72. See 263 N.W.2d at 621; note 11 supra.
73. 263 N.W.2d at 621 (quoting Great Northern I, 308 Minn. 221, 243 N.W.2d 302, cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1001 (1976)).
74. Id. at 621. Raising an apparent ripeness issue, the court indicated that the correct
remedy for any commodities clause violation due to Burlington Northern's anticipated
acquisition of the trust corpus would be an enforcement action under the Hepburn Act
after the reversion occurs. Id.; see Interstate Commerce Act § 12, 49 U.S.C. § 12(1)(a)
(1976) (Interstate Commerce Commission "is authorized and required to execute and
enforce the provisions of this chapter"). In addition, the court stated that the proper
remedy for the alleged charter violation by Burlington Northern would be an ultra vires
action under MINN. STAT. § 301.12 (1978) at the time of the reversion. See 263 N.W.2d at
621.
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act75 or trusts in violation of the rules against passive trusts," accumula-
tions,77 and perpetuities." Within this analysis, the illegal purpose situa-
tion may be contrasted with the Great Northern trust, which involved
the legal trust purpose of providing for the orderly mining of certain
mineral-bearing properties and payment of the income to a specific class
of beneficiaries with reversion over.
7 9
In either event, the legal consequence of finding an illegal trust pur-
pose or declaring that the reversioner could not legally hold title to the
reversion would be the same. First, when a trust fails because of an
illegal purpose, it has generally been held that a resulting trust in the
trustees for the benefit of the settlor or the settlor's successors is cre-
ated. 0 In the instance of the Great Northern trust, the reversioner,
Burlington Northern, is the settlor's successor in interest." Second, if a
legal prohibition would prevent a reversioner from retaining possession
of the corpus upon conclusion of a trust, the reversioner would simply
be required to dispose of the interest. 2 Accordingly, if upon termination
75. See, e.g., Bauer v. Bates Lumber Co., 84 N.M. 391, 392-93, 503 P.2d 1169, 1170-71
(1972) (trust created to circumvent statute illegal and unenforceable); cf. Evans v. Abney,
396 U.S. 435, 439 (1970) (charitable trust) (trust created for purpose of supporting segre-
gated park must fail due to illegality of segregation); Pennsylvania v. Brown, 260 F. Supp.
323, 357 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (charitable trust) (trust establishing charitable school for white
orphans cannot be enforced under applicable law), vacated on other grounds, 373 F.2d 771
(3d Cir. 1967).
76. See, e.g., Larkin v. McCabe, 211 Minn. 11, 23-24, 299 N.W. 649, 655 (1941) (passive
trust abolished by statute must fail as an illegal trust); Thompson v. Conant, 52 Minn.
208, 210-11, 53 N.W. 1145, 1145-46 (1893) (same).
77. See, e.g., Minnesota Loan & Trust Co. v. Douglas, 135 Minn. 413, 423-26, 161 N.W.
158, 162-64 (1917) (trust providing for accumulations beyond statutorily allowed period
declared void); Mann-Vynne v. Equitable Trust Co., 201 A.D. 149, 151-52, 194 N.Y.S. 50-
52 (1922) (clause providing for accumulation of income cannot be severed without altering
settlor's purpose; trust declared void).
78. See, e.g., Rong v. Hailer, 109 Minn. 191, 198, 123 N.W. 471, 472 (1909) (violation
of statutory rule against perpetuities voided trust).
79. Great Northern 11, 263 N.W.2d at 614.
80. See, e.g., Union Trust Co. v. McCaughn, 24 F.2d 459, 462 (3d Cir. 1927) (where
trust failed, resulting trust arose in favor of donor); Applegate v. Brown, 168 Neb. 190,
202, 95 N.W.2d 341, 348 (1959) (when trust purpose becomes illegal, there will be a
resulting trust in favor of settlor); Tilden v. Green, 130 N.Y. 29, 52, 28 N.E. 880, 884 (1891)
(when trust void for illegality, property vests in heirs); Continental Oil Co. v. Berry, 187
Okla. 390, 392-93, 103 P.2d 69, 71 (1940) (if trust rendered void, property vests in donor
or donor's heirs); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 345, Comment i at 197 (1959); A.
Scorr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 345.3, at 2743 (3d ed. 1967); cf. Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S.
435, 539 (1970) (charitable trust) (when trust purpose becomes illegal, corpus reverts to
settlor's heirs by operatioh of law).
81. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
82. Cf. United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26, 63-64 (1920) (combination of compa-
nies in violation of Sherman Anti-Trust Act and Hepburn Act must dissolve and provision
for sale of stock must be made). See generally United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co.,
213 U.S. 366 (1909). In Delaware & Hudson Co., the Court held that a railroad could be
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of the Great Northern trust a court should decide that the reversioner
cannot hold title to the corpus, then the railroad should be required to
sell the property, retaining the proceeds for its own benefit. 3 Therefore,
in both situations, the certificate holders would not be entitled to the
value of the reversion.
The Minnesota court concluded its opinion in Great Northern II by
giving the requested instructions to the trustees.' Formally adopting
sections 183 and 232 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts,81 the court
advised the trustees that the law of trusts requires the trustees of trusts
involving successive beneficiaries to treat all beneficiaries impartially
and "to act with due regard to their respective interests."86 The court's
prohibited from transporting commodities by the Hepburn Act only in three circumstan-
ces: first, when the commodity was manufactured, mined, or produced by a carrier and
at the time of transport the carrier had not divested itself of the commodity in good faith;
second, when the carrier owns the transported commodity in whole or in part; and third,
when the carrier had a direct or indirect interest in the transported commodity in a legal
or equitable sense. See id. at 415.
83. Under present Minnesota and federal law, it is unlikely that a court will order
Burlington Northern to divest itself of the Great Northern reversion upon termination of
the trust. The claim that transfer of the reversion to Burlington Northern would be ultra
vires appears untenable under Minnesota law: "Every corporation shall confine its acts
to those authorized by the statement of purposes in the articles of incorporation and
within the limitations and restrictions, if any, contained therein, but shall have the capac-
ity possessed by natural persons to perform all acts within or without this state." MINN.
STAT. § 301.12 (1978) (emphasis added). Because the Great Northern charter contains no
specific limitation upon the railroad's capacity to acquire property, possession of the Great
Northern trust reversion is within the corporate capacity of Burlington Northern. See also
Derfoot v. Farmers' & Merchants' Bank, 218 U.S. 281, 286 (1910) (in absence of statute
to the contrary, conveyance of real estate to corporation for purpose not in charter cannot
be impugned upon lack of capacity grounds).
The respondents also asserted that the Hepburn Act would prevent Burlington North-
ern from holding the Great Northern reversion. See notes 69-71 supra and accompanying
text. Although the respondents' position may be apparent from a simple reading of the
Hepburn Act, the argument fails to consider decisions of the United States Supreme Court
in which the rights to mineral commodities are involved. The Court has ruled that the
Hepburn Act is not violated when the railroad leases its interest in the commodity be-
cause, under a mineral lease, the railroad's interest ceases when ore is severed from the
ground. See, e.g., United States v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 238 U.S. 516, 536 (1915) (if
railroad sells coal at the mouth of mine, Hepburn Act not violated); United States v.
Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 413 (1909) (no violation if carrier disassociates itself
from commodity before transportation). Thus, when the mining rights are leased, the
railroad has no legal interest in the ore it transports. Under this analysis, Burlington
Northern's interest would not be invalidated by the Hepburn Act.
84. See 263 N.W.2d at 621-22.
85. See id. at 621.
86. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRusTs § 232 (1959)). When the trust instru-
ment is silent, modern trustees are subject to a statutory duty of impartiality codified in
the Minnesota Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act. See MINN. STAT. §§ 501.48-
.63 (1978). Subdivision 1 of section 501.49 states that "[a] trust shall be administered
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instruction could raise additional problems for the Great Northern
trustees. The trustees must now undertake only those transactions
that prejudice neither the income nor the reversionary beneficiaries.
Almost any sale of Great Northern assets, however, probably would be
prejudicial to the reversioner and could result in a suit to enforce the
trustees' duty of impartiality. While reaffirming the common law trust
principle that a fiduciary must be impartial in dealing with the con-I
flicting interests of successive beneficiaries to a trust,87 the court's
decision may have rendered ineffective trust provisions authorizing
discretionary conversion when the corpus consists of wasting assets.
Consequently, further decisions by the court may be necessary to
determine when the exercise of the trustees' discretion to liquidate
trust properties of a wasting character violates their duty of impartiality
to the reversioner.8
with due regard to the respective interests of income beneficiaries and remaindermen."
Id. § 501.49.
87. The trustees' duty to act without partiality towards both life tenants and remain-
dermen has been expressed in only one other Minnesota case. See Congdon v. Congdon,
160 Minn. 343, 376, 200 N.W. 76, 88 (1924).
88. The parties are currently before the district court to determine whether the approxi-
mately $3,000,000 in attorney's fees that have accrued since 1972 should be paid by the
trust. If this question is decided in the affirmative, the district court must then decide
whether the fees are payable out of principal or income. See Petitions and Motions for
Allowance of Attorney's Fees, In re Trust Known as Great Northern Iron Ore Properties,
No. 386008 (Minn. 2d Dist. Ct.). The principal or income question is of extreme import-
ance to the certificate holders because payment out of income has a potential impact upon
the value of their certificates. See generally Great Northern Iron Ore Properties, Seventy-
Second Annual Report of the Trustees to Certificate Holders 1 (1978) (average annual
trust net income over past five years is approximately $2,500,000).
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